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On the Equivalence of Two Security Notions
for Hierarchical Key Assignment Schemes
in the Unconditional Setting
Massimo Cafaro, Senior Member, IEEE , Roberto Civino, and Barbara Masucci
Abstract—The access control problem in a hierarchy can be solved by using a hierarchical key assignment scheme, where each
class is assigned an encryption key and some private information. A formal security analysis for hierarchical key assignment
schemes has been traditionally considered in two different settings, i.e., the unconditionally secure and the computationally
secure setting, and with respect to two different notions: security against key recovery (KR-security) and security with respect
to key indistinguishability (KI-security), with the latter notion being cryptographically stronger. Recently, Freire, Paterson and
Poettering proposed strong key indistinguishability (SKI-security) as a new security notion in the computationally secure setting,
arguing that SKI-security is strictly stronger than KI-security in such a setting. In this paper we consider the unconditionally
secure setting for hierarchical key assignment schemes. In such a setting the security of the schemes is not based on specific
unproven computational assumptions, i.e., it relies on the theoretical impossibility of breaking them, despite the computational
power of an adversary coalition. We prove that, in this setting, SKI-security is not stronger than KI-security, i.e., the two notions
are fully equivalent from an information-theoretic point of view.
Index Terms—Access controls, Information flow controls, Hierarchical design, Data dependencies, Coding and Information
Theory
✦
1 INTRODUCTION
IN the access control problem, we are concerned withthe problem of ensuring that only authorized users
of a computer system are entitled to access sensitive
information, according to access control policies that
organize users in a hierarchy of disjoint classes, called
security classes. The main reason for a hierarchy is the
need to assign different privileges and right sto users,
according to their role, competencies and responsibil-
ities.
Hierarchies model and reflect many real world
cases. A classical example is a hospital, in which
doctors are allowed accessing data concerning their
patients, but other people down in the hierarchy may
access this information only partially (for instance, ex-
ternal researchers may be given access to anonymized
data for clinical studies) or not at all (e.g., paramedics
may be denied access). Many different instances of
the access control problem commonly arise in govern-
ment agencies, in the military realm where classified
documents can be accessed by selected users on the
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basis of their security clearance level, etc.
In a hierarchical key assignment scheme, an encryp-
tion key and some private information are assigned
to each class in the hierarchy. The encryption key
protects each class data by means of a symmetric
crypto-system, whereas private information allows
each class to compute the keys assigned to all of the
classes lower down in the hierarchy. This assignment
is carried out by a central authority, the so-called
Trusted Authority (TA), which is active only in the
initial distribution phase.
Hierarchical key assignment schemes were first pro-
posed in the seminal paper of Akl and Taylor [1], and
improved in order to achieve better performances or
to allow hierarchies in which classes can be dynami-
cally inserted or deleted [2], [15], [17], [18], [19], [21],
[22]. Related work includes further research focusing
on more general access control policies [10], [20], [29].
Even though a large number of schemes had been
proposed, the lack of a formal security proof for many
of them led to an initial analysis of the security prop-
erties of these schemes, which confirmed that, indeed,
those schemes are insecure against collusive attacks
in which a coalition of users tries attacking a class up
in the hierarchy [5], [23], [28], [29]. A useful taxon-
omy and evaluation of several schemes appeared in
the literature can be found in [8]. A related branch
of research, focusing on the design of hierarchical
key assignment schemes with time-dependent keys,
called time-bound schemes, was started by Tzeng
[25]. However, Tzeng’s scheme was shown later to
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 6, NO. 1, JANUARY 2007 2
be insecure against collusive attacks [31]. Additional
efforts include [6], [16], [28], but none of these schemes
is secure against collusive attacks as well [3], [11], [24],
[30]. New time-bound schemes, derived from the Akl-
Taylor scheme, were given by Wang and Laih [27] and
Tzeng [26] and further analyzed in [9].
The most used approach to hierarchical key assign-
ment schemes is based on unproven specific compu-
tational assumptions. In this computational setting, a
hierarchical key assignment scheme is provably-secure
under a complexity assumption if the existence of an
adversary A breaking the scheme is equivalent to the
existence of an adversary B breaking the computa-
tional assumption. The usual method of construction
of B uses the adversary A as a black-box. The need
for formal security requirements in the computational
setting was first addressed in [2] by Atallah et al.,
who proposed two different security notions for hi-
erarchical key assignment schemes: security against
key recovery (KR-security) and security with respect to
key indistinguishability (KI-security). KR-security cor-
responds to the requirement that an adversary is not
able to compute a key that it should not have access
to. On the other hand, KI-security formalizes the
requirement that the adversary is not able to learn any
information about a key that it should not have access
to, i.e., it is not able to distinguish it from a random
string having the same length.
Recently, Freire et al. [14] proposed a new secu-
rity notion for hierarchical key assignment schemes
in the computationally secure setting. Such a def-
inition, called strong security with respect to key-
indistinguishability (SKI-security), formalizes the re-
quirement that the adversary is not able to learn
any information about a key that it should not have
access to, even if he has the additional capability of
gaining access to encryption keys associated to all
of the classes above the target class in the hierarchy.
Notice that these encryption keys might leak through
usage and their compromise could not directly lead
to a compromise of the private information or the
encryption key of the target class. Freire et al. [14] ar-
gued that their new notion is strictly stronger than the
existing KI-security notion, and provide SKI-secure
constructions for hierarchical key assignment schemes
using pseudorandom functions and forward-secure
pseudorandom generators. However, no formal secu-
rity analysis was given to prove that SKI-security is
actually stronger than traditional KI-security.
In this paper we focus on an information-theoretic
approach which differs from the above computational
approach since it does not depend on any compu-
tational assumption. Such an approach has already
been considered in [13], [12] to analyze key assign-
ment schemes for arbitrary access control policies,
as well as in [4] to analyze time-bound hierarchical
key assignment schemes. In such an unconditionally
secure setting the security of a hierarchical key assign-
ment scheme relies on the theoretical impossibility
of breaking it, despite the computational power of
an adversary coalition. In particular we prove that,
in the unconditionally secure setting, SKI-security is
not stronger than KI-security, i.e., the two definitions
are, instead, fully equivalent from an information-
theoretic point of view.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.
In Section 2 we first recall the formal definition of
hierarchical key assignment schemes and formalize
the notions of KI-security and SKI-security from an
information-theoretic point of view. Then, we prove
in Section 3 the equivalence, in the unconditionally
secure setting, of the two security notions. Finally, we
draw our conclusions in Section 4.
2 HIERARCHICAL KEY ASSIGNMENT
SCHEMES
Consider a set of users divided into a number of
disjoint classes, called security classes. A security class
can represent a person, a department or a user group
in an organization. A binary relation  that partially
orders the set of classes V is defined in accordance
with authority, position or power of each class in V .
The poset (V,) is called a partially ordered hierarchy.
For any two classes u and v, the notation u  v is used
to indicate that the users in v can access u’s data. We
denote by Av the set {u ∈ V : u  v}, for any v ∈ V ,
as shown in Figure 1.
v
Av := {u ∈ V : u  v}
Fig. 1. An example of the Av set.
The partially ordered hierarchy (V,) can be rep-
resented by a directed graph where each class corre-
sponds to a vertex in the graph and there is an edge
from class v to class u if and only if u  v. Further, this
graph can be simplified by eliminating all self-loops
and edges which can be implied by the property of
the transitive closure. We denote by G = (V,E) the
resulting directed acyclic graph, which is called an
access graph.
A hierarchical key assignment scheme for a partially
ordered hierarchy represented by an access graph
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G = (V,E) is a method to assign a private information
su and a key ku to each class u ∈ V . The generation
and distribution of the private information and keys
is carried out by a trusted third party, the TA, which is
connected to each class by means of a secure channel.
The encryption key ku can be used by users belonging
to class u to protect their sensitive data by means
of a symmetric crypto-system, whereas, the private
information sv can be used by users belonging to class
v to compute the key ku for any class u ∈ Av.
Following the line of [4], [12], [13], we formally de-
fine hierarchical key assignment schemes by using the
entropy function (we refer the reader to the Appendix
for some properties of the entropy function and to
[7] for a complete treatment of Information Theory),
mainly because this leads to a compact and simple
description of the schemes and because the entropy
approach takes into account all of the probability
distributions on the keys assigned to the classes. The
same approach has been used in [4], [12], [13] to
analyze different kinds of key assignment schemes.
In the following, given a probability space (Ω,F ,P),
we denote with a boldface capital letter a random
variable defined on Ω (e.g., X : Ω → R) and taking
values on a set, denoted by the corresponding capital
letter (e.g.,X ⊆ R). The values such a random variable
can take are denoted by the corresponding lower case
letter (e.g., x ∈ X). Moreover, we write p(x) for
pX(x) := P{X = x}x∈X to refer to the distribution of
X. Hereafter all of the random variables considered
will be discrete. Given a random variable X, we
denote by H(X) the Shannon entropy of X.
Now we are ready to describe the correctness and se-
curity requirements that a hierarchical key assignment
scheme has to satifsy.
Correctness Requirement: Each user can compute the
key held by any class lower down in the hierarchy.
Formally, for each class v ∈ V and each class u ∈ Av ,
it holds that
H(Ku|Sv) = 0.
Notice that the correctness requirement is equiva-
lent to saying that the value of the private information
sv held by each user belonging to a class v ∈ V
corresponds to a unique value of the key ku, for each
class u ∈ Av .
Definition 2.1. Let G = (V,E) be an access graph.
The set Σ = {(Ku,Su)}u∈V is called a Hierarchical
Key Assignment Scheme for G if the random variables
Ku, Su, for each u ∈ V , satisfy the above correctness
requirement.
In order to achieve security, given a class u ∈ V , the
key ku should be protected against attacks mounted
by a coalition of users belonging to each class v such
that u 6∈ Av . The amount of information available to
the coalition strictly depends on the kind of secu-
rity one would like to attain: first, we consider the
case in which the coalition only owns the private
information assigned to each class in the coalition;
later, we will consider the case in which the coalition
also holds the encryption keys assigned to classes
which can access class u. Let Fu := {v ∈ V : u 6∈ Av}
be the set of classes which are not allowed to access
the sensitive data of users in class u. Moreover, let
Cu := {v ∈ V : u ∈ Av} \ {u} be the set of classes,
different from u, which are entitled to access the
sensitive data of users in class u. Figure 2 depicts the
sets Fu and Cu. Regarding the relationship among the
sets {u}, Fu and Cu , it can be easily verified that these
sets are a partition of the set of nodes V .
u
Fu := {v ∈ V : u /∈ Av}
Cu := {v ∈ V : u ∈ Av} \ {u}
Fig. 2. An example of the Fu and Cu sets.
Given u ∈ V and X ⊆ Fu, where X =
{v1, v2, . . . , vn}, let SX be the random variable
Sv1:vn = (Sv1 ,Sv2 , . . . ,Svn) whose law is the joint law
of the random variables Sv1 ,Sv2 , . . . ,Svn . Similarly,
given Y ⊆ Cu, where Y = {w1, w2, . . . , wm}, let KY be
the random variable Kw1:wm = (Kw1 ,Kw2 , . . . ,Kwm)
whose law is the joint law of the random variables
Kw1 ,Kw2 , . . . ,Kwm .
We consider two different security notions: security
with respect to key indistinguishability (KI-security) and
strong security with respect to key indistinguishability
(SKI-security). Security with respect to key indistin-
guishability formalizes the requirement that the ad-
versary coalition is not able to learn any information
about a key that it should not have access to, i.e., it is
not able to distinguish it from a random string having
the same length.
KI-Security Requirement: A coalition of users have
absolutely no information about each key the coalition
is not entitled to obtain.
Formally, for each class u ∈ V and each coalition
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X ⊆ Fu, it holds that
H(Ku|SX) = H(Ku).
Definition 2.2. Let G = (V,E) be an access graph and
let Σ = {(Ku,Su)}u∈V be a hierarchical key assignment
scheme for G. The scheme Σ provides key indistinguisha-
bility (or KI-security) if the random variables Ku, Su, for
each u ∈ V , satisfy the above KI-security requirement.
On the other hand, strong security with respect
to key indistinguishability formalizes the requirement
that the adversary coalition is not able to learn any
information about a key that it should not have
access to, even though the coalition has the additional
capability of gaining access to the encryption keys
associated to other classes in the hierarchy.
SKI-Security Requirement: A coalition of users have
absolutely no information about each key the coalition
is not entitled to obtain, even though the coalition has the
additional capability of gaining access to the encryption
keys associated to other classes in the hierarchy.
Formally, for each class u ∈ V , each coalition X ⊆ Fu,
and each set Y ⊆ Cu, it holds that
H(Ku|SX ,KY ) = H(Ku).
Definition 2.3. Let G = (V,E) be an access graph and
let Σ = {(Ku,Su)}u∈V be a hierarchical key assignment
scheme for G. The scheme Σ provides strong key indis-
tinguishability (or SKI-security) if the random variables
Ku, Su, for each u ∈ V , satisfy the above SKI-security
requirement.
Remark 2.1. It is evident that, given a scheme
Σ = {(Ku,Su)}u∈V , in order to prove its KI-security it
is enough proving that
∀u ∈ V, H(Ku|SFu) = H(Ku). (1)
Eq. (1) and Lemma A.6 grant that the requirement also
holds for all subsets X ⊆ Fu. Analogously, in order to
prove SKI-security it is enough proving that
∀u ∈ V, H(Ku|SFu ,KCu) = H(Ku). (2)
3 EQUIVALENCE OF SKI-SECURITY AND
KI-SECURITY
In the following we study the relationship between
the notions of KI-security and SKI-security for hier-
archical key assignment schemes. We first notice that
SKI-security implies KI-security.
Indeed, for each u ∈ V , each X ⊆ Fu, and each
Y ⊆ Cu, it follows from Lemma A.6 and A.1 that
H(Ku|SX) ≥ H(Ku|SX ,KY ) = H(Ku).
Thus, if the SKI-security requirement holds, the KI-
security requirement also holds.
We need the next definition.
Definition 3.1. Let G = (V,E) be an access graph and
let n ∈ N. The sequence (u1, u2, . . . , un) ∈ V
n is well
ordered if n = 1 or n > 1 and for each j ∈ {2, 3, . . . , n}
it holds {ui}
j−1
i=1 ⊆ Fuj .
We also recall the definition of topological sorting in
a directed acyclic graph.
Definition 3.2. Let G = (V,E) be a directed acyclic
graph, let n ∈ N, V = {ui}
n
i=1 and let σ ∈ Sn be a
permutation. The sequence X = (uσ(1), uσ(2), . . . , uσ(n))
is a topological sort of G if for each u, v ∈ V such that
(u, v) ∈ E, then u appears before v in X .
Example 3.1. Let G = (V,E) be an access graph, let
n ∈ N and let X = (un, un−1, . . . , u1) be a topological sort
of G. It is easy to see that the sequence (u1, u2, . . . , un) is
well ordered. Indeed, assume by contradiction that there
exist i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, with i ≤ j, such that the
users belonging to class ui are authorized to access the
information of class uj . Therefore we have that (ui, uj) ∈ E
and it follows that ui appears before uj in X , so that i > j,
which is a contradiction.
The following lemma is crucial to understand the
relationship between KI-security and SKI-security.
Lemma 3.1. Let G = (V,E) be an access graph,
Σ = {(Ku,Su)}u∈V be a KI-secure hierarchical
key assignment scheme for G and let n ∈ N.
If (u1, u2, . . . , un) ∈ V
n is a well ordered sequence, then
H(Ku1:un) =
n∑
j=1
H(Kuj ).
In particular, the random variables Ku1 ,Ku2 , . . . ,Kun are
independent.
Proof: By Lemma A.2 it is enough proving that
H(Ku1:un) ≥
n∑
j=1
H(Kuj ).
Since (u1, u2, . . . , un) ∈ V
n is a well ordered sequence,
for each j ∈ {2, 3, . . . , n} it follows that {ui}
j−1
i=1 ⊆ Fuj .
Therefore, from the KI-security requirement we have
that
H(Kuj |Su1:uj−1) = H(Kuj ).
Moreover, from the correctness requirement, it follows
that
H(Kuj |Suj ) = 0.
From Lemma A.3 it follows that
H(Ku1:uj−1 |Su1:uj−1 ) ≤
j−1∑
i=1
H(Kui |Su1:uj−1)
≤
j−1∑
i=1
H(Kui |Sui) = 0,
thus we have
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H(Ku1:uj−1 |Su1:uj−1 ) = 0. (3)
Moreover, by Lemma A.6 it follows that
H(Ku1:uj−1 |Su1:uj−1 ,Kuj ) ≤ H(Ku1:uj−1 |Su1:uj−1),
therefore,
H(Ku1:uj−1 |Su1:uj−1 ,Kuj ) = 0. (4)
Consider the conditional mutual information
I
(
Kuj ;Ku1:uj−1 |Su1:uj−1
)
. By using Lemma A.7
we deduce that
H(Kuj |Su1:uj−1)−H(Kuj |Ku1:uj−1 ,Su1:uj−1 )
= H(Ku1:uj−1 |Su1:uj−1)−H(Ku1:uj−1 |Kuj ,Su1:uj−1),
and, by using Equations (3) e (4), it follows that
H(Kuj |Su1:uj−1) = H(Kuj |Ku1:uj−1 ,Su1:uj−1 ).
Therefore, from Lemma A.4 we have that
H(Ku1:un) = H(Ku1) +
n∑
j=2
H(Kuj |Ku1:uj−1)
≥ H(Ku1)
+
n∑
j=2
H(Kuj |Ku1:uj−1 ,Su1:uj−1)
= H(Ku1) +
n∑
j=2
H(Kuj |Su1:uj−1 )
= H(Ku1) +
n∑
j=2
H(Kuj )
=
n∑
j=1
H(Kuj ).
Moreover, from Lemma A.2, it holds that the random
variables Ku1 ,Ku2 , . . . ,Kun are independent. Thus,
the lemma holds.
We are going to show that such a result allows
proving the equivalence of the two security notions.
Moreover, it is worth noting here that, reasoning as
before, we can prove that KI-security is a sufficient
condition for the independence of all of the keys in
a hierarchical key assignment scheme. Indeed, the
following theorem holds.
Theorem 3.1. Let G = (V,E) be an access graph and
let Σ = {(Ku,Su)}u∈V be a hierarchical key assignment
scheme for G. If Σ is KI-secure for G, then the random
variables {Ku}u∈V are independent.
Proof: It suffices proceeding as in Lemma 3.1,
using the well ordered sequence resulting by any
arbitrary topological sort of G reverse ordered (see for
instance Example 3.1).
As said before, Lemma 3.1 will be used to prove the
equivalence of KI-security and SKI-security. However,
before proving the equivalence, we need some addi-
tional preliminary results.
Lemma 3.2. Let G = (V,E) be an access graph,
let Σ = {(Ku,Su)}u∈V be a KI-secure hierarchical
key assignment scheme for G and let n,m ∈ N.
If (u1, u2, . . . , un+m) ∈ V
n+m is a well ordered sequence,
then
H(Kun+1:un+m |Kun ,Su1:un−1) =
m∑
j=1
H(Kun+j ).
Proof: By Lemma A.1 and A.2 it is enough show-
ing that
H(Kun+1:un+m |Kun ,Su1:un−1) ≥
m∑
j=1
H(Kun+j ).
From the correctness requirement it follows that, for
each j ∈ {2, 3, . . . ,m+ 1},
H(Kun:un+j−1 |Su1:un+j−1) ≤
j−1∑
i=0
H(Kun+i |Su1:un+j−1)
≤
j−1∑
i=0
H(Kun+i |Sun+i) = 0,
thus
H(Kun:un+j−1 |Su1:un+j−1) = 0, (5)
and consequently,
H(Kun:un+j−1 |Kun+j ,Su1:un+j−1) = 0. (6)
Consider the conditional mutual information
I
(
Kun+j ;Kun:un+j−1 |Su1:un+j−1
)
. We have that
H(Kun+j |Su1:un+j−1)
−H(Kun+j |Kun:un+j−1 ,Su1:un+j−1)
= H(Kun:un+j−1 |Su1:un+j−1)
−H(Kun:un+j−1 |Kun+j ,Su1:un+j−1),
and, by using (5) and (6), it follows that
H(Kun+j |Su1:un+j−1) = H(Kun+j |Kun:un+j−1 ,Su1:un+j−1).
Now, letting Q = H(Kun+1:un+m |Kun ,Su1:un−1), from
Lemma A.5 we have that
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Q = H(Kun+1 |Kun ,Su1:un−1)
+
m∑
j=2
H(Kun+j |Kun:un+j−1 ,Su1:un−1)
≥ H(Kun+1 |Kun ,Su1:un)
+
m∑
j=2
H(Kun+j |Kun:un+j−1 ,Su1:un+j−1)
= H(Kun+1 |Su1:un)
+
m∑
j=2
H(Kun+j |Su1:un+j−1)
=
m∑
j=1
H(Kun+j),
in which the last equality follows from the well order-
ing assumption and from the KI-security requirement.
Thus, the lemma holds.
Corollary 3.1. Let G = (V,E) be an access graph,
let Σ = {(Ku,Su)}u∈V be a KI-secure hierarchical
key assignment scheme for G and let n,m ∈ N.
If (u1, u2, . . . , un+m) ∈ V
n+m is a well ordered sequence,
then
H(Kun+1:un+m |Su1:un−1) =
m∑
j=1
H(Kun+j).
Proof: From Lemma A.6 and 3.1 it follows that
H(Kun+1:un+m |Kun ,Su1:un−1) ≤ H(Kun+1:un+m |Su1:un−1)
≤ H(Kun+1:un+m)
=
m∑
j=1
H(Kun+j ),
consequently, the thesis follows from Lemma 3.2.
Theorem 3.2. Let G = (V,E) be an access
graph, Σ = {(Ku,Su)}u∈V a KI-secure hierarchical
key assignment scheme for G, n,m ∈ N.
If (u1, u2, . . . , un+m) ∈ V
n+m s a well ordered sequence,
then
H(Kun |Kun+1:un+m ,Su1:un−1) = H(Kun).
Proof: Consider the conditional mutual informa-
tion I(Kun ;Kun+1:un+m |Su1:un−1). It holds that
H(Kun |Su1:un−1)−H(Kun |Kun+1:un+m ,Su1:un−1)
= H(Kun+1:un+m |Su1:un−1)
−H(Kun+1:un+m |Kun ,Su1:un−1)
=
m∑
j=1
H(Kun+j)−
m∑
j=1
H(Kun+j ) (7)
= 0
where in Eq. (7) we used Corollary 3.1 and Lemma
3.2. It holds that
H(Kun |Kun+1:un+m ,Su1:un−1) = H(Kun |Su1:un−1)
= H(Kun),
where in the last equality we used the KI-security
requirement. Thus, the theorem holds.
We are now in the position to state the following
theorem, which is the main result and contribution of
this paper.
Theorem 3.3. Let G = (V,E) be an access graph and
let Σ = {(Ku,Su)}u∈V be a hierarchical key assignment
scheme for G. If Σ is KI-secure for G, then Σ is also SKI-
secure for G.
Proof: Let u ∈ V . By Remark 2.1, the SKI-security
of Σ is proved if we can show that Eq. (2) holds, i.e.,
H(Ku|KCu ,SFu) = H(Ku).
Let n,m ∈ N and u1, u2, . . . , un+m be an
enumeration of V such that {ui}
n−1
i=1 = Fu,
un = u, and {ui}
n+m
i=n+1 = Cu. Moreover, let
σ ∈ Sn−1 and τ ∈ Sm be permutations such that
(uσ(1), uσ(2), . . . , uσ(n−1)) is a topological sort of Fu
and (uτ(n+1), uτ(n+2), . . . , uτ(n+m)) a topological sort
of Cu. Then, the sequence
(u
σ(n−1), . . . , uσ(2), uσ(1), un, uτ(n+m), . . . , uτ(n+2), uτ(n+1))
is well ordered, thus, by Theorem 3.2 it follows that
H(Kun |Kuτ(n+m):uτ(n+1) ,Suσ(n−1):uσ(1)) = H(Kun),
i.e.,
H(Ku|KCu ,SFu) = H(Ku).
Thus, the theorem holds.
4 CONCLUSIONS
Freire, Paterson and Poettering [14] recently proposed
a new security notion for hierarchical key assignment
schemes in the computationally secure setting, called
strong security with respect to key indistinguishability
(SKI-security). They argued that their new notion is
stronger than the traditional KI-security one, but did
not prove formally that indeed this is the case. In this
paper we showed that, in the unconditionally secure
setting, SKI-security is not stronger than KI-security,
i.e., the two definitions are fully equivalent from an
information-theoretic point of view.
APPENDIX A
We recall here a few basic results of Information
Theory used in our definitions and proofs. For a
complete treatment of the subject the reader is advised
to consult [7].
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Definition A.1. Let X be a random variable with distri-
bution p(x). The entropy of X is the operator
H(X) := −
∑
x∈X
p(x) log(p(x)),
where log denotes base 2 logarithm.
The entropy satisfies the following property
H(X) ≥ 0
with equality if and only if there exists x ∈ X such
that p(x) = 1.
Definition A.2. Let X,Y be random variables with joint
distribution p(x, y). The joint entropy of X and Y is the
operator
H(X,Y) := −
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
p(x, y) log (p(x, y)).
Definition A.3. Let X,Y be random variables with joint
distribution p(x, y) and conditional distribution p(x|y).
The conditional entropy of X given Y is the operator
H(X|Y) := −
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
p(x, y) log(p(x|y)).
Lemma A.1. Let X,Y be random variables. Then,
H(X|Y) ≤ H(X).
Moreover, the equality holds if and only if X e Y are
independent.
Lemma A.2. Let n ∈ N and let X1,X2, . . . ,Xn be
random variables. It holds that
H(X1:n) ≤
n∑
i=1
H(Xi).
Moreover, the equality holds if and only if X1,X2, . . . ,Xn
are independent.
Lemma A.3. Let n ∈ N and let X1,X2, . . . ,Xn,Y be
random variables. It holds that
H(X1:n|Y) ≤
n∑
i=1
H(Xi|Y).
Lemma A.4. Let n ∈ N \ {1} and let X1,X2, . . . ,Xn be
random variables. It holds that
H(X1,n) = H(X1) +
n∑
i=2
H(Xi|X1:(i−1)).
Lemma A.5. Let n ∈ N \ {1} and let X1,X2, . . . ,Xn,Y
be random variables. It holds that
H(X1:n|Y) = H(X1|Y) +
n∑
i=2
H(Xi|X1:(i−1),Y).
Definition A.4. Let X,Y be random variables. The mu-
tual information between X and Y is the operator
I(X;Y) := H(X)−H(X|Y).
From Lemma A.1 follows that I(X;Y) ≥ 0 and it
is easy to verify that I(X;Y) = I(Y;X).
Definition A.5. Let X,Y,Z be random variables. The
conditional mutual information of X and Y given Z is
the operator
I(X;Y|Z) := H(X|Z)−H(X|Y,Z).
Lemma A.6. Let X,Y,Z be random variables. It holds
that I(X;Y|Z) ≥ 0. Moreover,
H(X|Y,Z) ≤ H(X|Z).
Lemma A.7. Let X,Y,Z be random variables. It holds
that
I(X;Y|Z) = I(Y;X|Z).
In particular,
H(X|Z) −H(X|Y,Z) = H(Y|Z) −H(Y|X,Z).
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